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ABSTRACT
To understand the conditions and experiences that might make an individual more
vulnerable to terrorist radicalization, this study examines a sample group of Muslim’s in
Great Britain to determine if responses to survey questions on a range of issues and
perceptions can provide indications of an individual’s vulnerability to terrorist
radicalization. Key to this process was the development of a vulnerability to
radicalization score that allowed for an analysis of the relationship between this score and
different independent variables.
The dataset for this study was obtained using the Pew Research Center’s Spring
2006 Global Attitudes Project 15 Nation Survey. This survey contains a significant
oversampling of Muslim respondents allowing for the statistical analysis of potential
vulnerability. It is important to understand that this analysis does not provide any
indication of radicalization, but a vulnerability based upon accepted theories discussed in
terrorism literature. The testing of commonly held theories regarding terrorist
radicalization produced a very different picture from what has been viewed in the past.
New findings include a previously unrecognized quantity of women who are potentially
vulnerable to radicalization. Additionally, income and education do not seem to play the
pivotal role that is usually expected, and analysis indicates there is a link between the
perceptions of actions by the United States government in the war to combat terrorism
and the respondents’ vulnerability to radicalization.
Recommendations are for the refinement and expansion of this study to include
the remaining Western European democracies that were sampled and the United States in
order to perform a comparative analysis proving a broader understanding regarding the
vulnerability of Muslims to terrorist radicalization in Western Democracies.
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................. v
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................... 5
Terrorist Psychopathy ..................................................................................................... 6
Frustration Aggression Theory ....................................................................................... 7
Economic deprivation/Poverty Theory ........................................................................... 8
Terrorism as political violence...................................................................................... 11
The Process Model........................................................................................................ 11
Government policy as a catalyst ................................................................................... 14
Immigration policy........................................................................................................ 14
Social Identity/Assimilation.......................................................................................... 16
Marginalization ............................................................................................................. 18
Security policy .............................................................................................................. 19
Demographics ............................................................................................................... 21
Group Dynamics ........................................................................................................... 22
Recruitment of Muslim youths ..................................................................................... 24
College recruitment....................................................................................................... 25
METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................... 27
The Purpose of this Analysis ........................................................................................ 27
Data Source ................................................................................................................... 27
Radicalization as the Dependent Variable .................................................................... 28
Self identification ...................................................................................................... 29
Identification of external protagonist ........................................................................ 30
Conflict ..................................................................................................................... 31
Concern for the future of Muslims............................................................................ 32
Perceived connection with terrorist figure ................................................................ 32
Refusing to accept reality.......................................................................................... 33
Acceptance of violence as a tactic ............................................................................ 33
Independent Variables .................................................................................................. 35
Age ............................................................................................................................ 35
Gender ....................................................................................................................... 35
Social satisfaction ..................................................................................................... 36
iii

Education level.......................................................................................................... 37
Income levels ............................................................................................................ 38
Exposure to racial or religious discrimination .......................................................... 39
Immigration status and citizenship ........................................................................... 39
Reaction to the War on Terror .................................................................................. 40
Religiosity ................................................................................................................. 40
Geographic location .................................................................................................. 41
Hypotheses .................................................................................................................... 42
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS ......................................................................................... 45
CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................... 65
Recommendations for future research .......................................................................... 67
APPENDIX A CREATION OF THE VULNERABILITY TO RADICALIZATION
SCORE.............................................................................................................................. 69
APPENDIX B USER AGREEMENT AND DISCLAIMER FOR THE PEW
RESEARCH CENTER ..................................................................................................... 73
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 77

iv

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Income ................................................................................................................ 10
Table 2 Education levels ................................................................................................... 37
Table 3 Male / Female ...................................................................................................... 46
Table 4 Vulnerability / Education ..................................................................................... 49
Table 5 Vulerability / Income ........................................................................................... 51
Table 6 Vulnerability / Bad experience ............................................................................ 52
Table 7 Vulnerability / Satisfaction .................................................................................. 53
Table 8 Vulnerability / Born in Great Britain ................................................................... 54
Table 9 Vulerablity / Age ................................................................................................. 56
Table 10 Vulnerability / Reporting of abuses ................................................................... 59
Table 11 Vulnerability / Mosque Attendance ................................................................... 63
Table 12 Vulnerability / Mosque attendance: male/female .............................................. 64

v

INTRODUCTION
On July 29, 2007, two cars loaded with explosives were discovered in London.
The next day two Islamic radicals drove a Jeep Cherokee into the terminal at Glasgow
International Airport and attempted to explode the vehicle. These same individuals were
found to have been responsible for the failed car bombs discovered the previous evening.
But, unlike the attacks of September 11, 2001, these bombers were not sent from
Afghanistan with orders to commits these acts. As it turns out, these men were trained
physicians working in the United Kingdom. Dr. Bilal Abdullah was 27 years old, born in
the United Kingdom, while his companion Dr. Kafeel Ahmed was born in India. Both
men worked as doctors at the Royal Alexandra Hospital. What caused these men, and
other British citizens implicated in the attacks, to become radicalized and seek to commit
these acts of terror? Furthermore, why do we find young Muslim men: children and
grandchildren of Muslim immigrants; born, raised, and schooled in a developed nation
such as the United Kingdom joining the jihad and committing terrorist acts?
It is unfortunate, but as Barbara Crenshaw (1983) points out when she quotes
Irving Louis Horowitz, “terrorism has become a mode of doing politics” (Crenshaw
1983, 143). For groups like the Irish Republican Army, the German Red Army Faction,
the Weathermen, the Aum Shinrikyo, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Tamil Tigers(to
name only a few of the many groups), political violence escalating to acts of terrorism is
the primary vehicle for attempting to affect political change. Konrad Kellen (1998)
provides as an example the radicals in West Germany in the 1960s, explaining that
“when there was no substantial response to their political drives among either the elite or
the masses, their ideology turned them into terrorists”(Kellen 1998, 47). While terrorism
1

has not changed the nature of power, it has since September 11, 2001 changed the way
many states address immigration, security and some social policies. Therefore we must
ask how have these policies changed, and have these changes had the effect of reducing
or strengthening the available body of recruits for terrorist organizations? An
examination of a sample of the Muslim population in the United Kingdom provides us
with an opportunity to make just such an evaluation. With a purported rise in the
radicalization and the advent of “homegrown” Islamist terrorists willing to commit
suicide attacks of terror, such an analysis can be seen as an imperative.
This research assumes that in order to combat homegrown Islamic terrorism it is
necessary to understand what we mean by “radicalized.” Radicalization can be defined
as “the process of adopting or promoting an extremist belief system for the purpose of
facilitating ideologically-based violence to advance political, religious, or social
change.” 1 It is commonly held that in certain countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
Syria, this radicalization process is a part of the enculturation and education of the
population. But is this the case? An examination of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
shows this group did not begin to become radicalized until the government outlawed their
organization and began to arrest and persecute its members.
In Europe, the Muslim population has increased significantly as a result of
immigration with an estimated 15-20 million Muslims now living in Europe,
1.6-2 million in the United Kingdom alone (Leiken 2005). With the real possibility of
radicalization, these growing populations become a major concern, and each new attack
brings calls for a crack down on Muslim extremists. But do these types of focused
1

H.R. 1955 – To prevent homegrown terrorism, and for other purposes. April 19, 2007.
United States House of Representatives.
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government policies reduce the potential for violent political action, or is it possible that
they actually serve to further radicalize the Muslim population? Is it possible that
government policy can serve as a catalyst for radicalization? If so, what actions or
policies can be identified that would cause someone who had previously been a law
abiding moderate Muslim and lifelong citizen of the United Kingdom to become
radicalized?
Within the broader study of terrorism there have been some attempts by
academics to understand Islamic radicalization. The majority of the scholarly work on
radicalization has been centered on attempts to understand Islamic ideology and the
Islamist agenda. Further, considerable work has been done in an attempt to identify the
structure of terrorist organizations and cells, recruitment practices, and phenomenon such
as suicide attacks. This paper will seek to build on this body of work indirectly by
answering the recent call by many scholars to understand the roots of terrorism.
In order to undertake this challenge it is first necessary to establish that becoming
a terrorist is a process, with the first step in this process being radicalization. With this
starting point it is then possible to consider the factors, experiences, and perceptions that
might make one vulnerable to terrorist radicalization. Is it poverty? Do perceptions
regarding a lack of upward mobility or prosperity due to limited educational opportunities
or being a recently arrived immigrant make one vulnerable? Understanding the influence
of these and other factors is essential if one is to consider the vulnerability of the Muslim
population in Great Britain to terrorist radicalization.
This analysis provides insights into this vulnerability and the influencing factors.
Interestingly, the percentage of women found to be vulnerable to radicalization within
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this sample is significantly higher than the almost uniformly male-centered profiles that
have been constructed by many terrorism analysts and scholars previously. It is also
clear that the policies of the United States and its engagement in fighting terrorism and its
involvement in the Middle East is a source of frustration among the Muslim population in
Great Britain. Additionally, several commonly held assumptions regarding education and
income are shown to not have the influencing effect they were once considered to have.
Lastly, the vulnerability of British born Muslims, as seen in the high percentage of
naturally born citizens who are vulnerable to radicalization, seems to provide
reinforcement to the concerns regarding the threat of homegrown terrorists within Great
Britain.

4

LITERATURE REVIEW
The difficulty in providing a literature review that discusses the concept of
radicalization that leads to terrorism is the simple fact that very few studies have been
focused on this earliest stage in the process of becoming a terrorist. A considerable
portion of the terrorist literature is concerned with the history of terrorism, an accounting
of terrorist groups, and the acts they have committed, or the development of timelines to
explain the growth of a particular terrorist group like al-Qaeda and the events that
transpired leading up to and including the committing of terrorist acts. What is missing
from the literature on terrorism is substantive work that seeks to explain why young men
and women become terrorists. Just now, we are beginning to see in the literature calls for
this type of analysis. Scholars are recognizing that if we are to truly understand
terrorism, we must begin to gather some understanding of the sources and the process of
radicalization that leads individuals to join terrorist groups or cells (Sageman 2008, Silke
2004). Especially now, given the rise of the ‘homegrown’ terrorist in western
democracies like the United Kingdom and Germany, the need for such knowledge is even
more pressing.
Over the years there have been many attempts to identify a terrorist profile in the
hope of being able to more easily identify those individuals who are likely to join the
ranks of the terrorist organizations. These efforts have ranged from suggestions of
psychological deficiencies to economic hardship. While some of these theories have
been found to be unrepresentative of the population being studies, it is important to
consider that while there is no one phenomenon that can explain why someone commits
terrorist acts, it may be possible to examine these various explanations as a collective of
events that may lead one to become radicalized and involved in terrorist activities. The
5

following represents a collection of some of the more popular theories that have been
used to explain terrorism.
Terrorist Psychopathy
For years the popular notion among some social scientists was that it might be
possible to create a terrorist profile. One theory held that terrorists were psychologically
unbalanced individuals who lashed out at the world. Konrad Kellen (1982) discussed
whether terrorists were “crazy.” In his study, he cites Franco Ferracuti’s Psychiatric
Aspect of Terrorism in Italy. In this work, Kellen found that Ferracuti considered right
wing terrorists to frequently be pathological while the left wing terrorists who adhered to
an unrealistic ideology were more normal yet still fanatical (Kellen 1982; Laqueur 1987)
Jerrold Post (1998) argues that terrorists act out of a sort of psycho-logic whereby
their joining, participation, and committing of terrorist acts is a result of psychological
abnormalities (see also Sageman 2004). Post (2007) goes further, however, to posit that
individuals become terrorists because they have suffered some sort of injustice as a child,
are rebelling against authority due to having an authoritative father, or have been raised
up in a family that adheres to a terrorist ideology. In his latest work, The Mind of the
Terrorist, Post is careful to avoid openly stating that terrorists suffer from some sort of
psychopathy, but goes on to offer a laundry list of potential psychological explanations of
why someone becomes a terrorist. His recounting of individual terrorist story’s provide
some childhood experience that he feels drove them to join a terrorist organization. Post
(2007) does not, however, cover the time when this individual made the decision to
become a terrorist. He jumps from what he perceived to be the psychological ‘root’ of
the problem and does not consider the process by which this individual became
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radicalized and then incorporated into a terrorist organization. Post continues to see the
terrorist as a damaged individual who is acting out in response to some prior
psychological trauma or individual psychopathy.
However, Barbara Crenshaw (2000), finds this tendency to see terrorists “as
motivated by personality disorders such as narcissism or paranoia,” to be seeking to
diagnose from a distance and only serves to, “taint terrorism with a pathology aura”
(Crenshaw 2000, 407; see also Horgan 2005). Marc Sageman (2004) adds, in his study
of known terrorists (172 subjects) and terrorist groups, he did not detect “a pattern of
paranoid personality or lifestyle before joining jihad” (Sageman 2004, 83). Those who
reject this psychological explanation suggest becoming a terrorist is a process. It should
be considered that while no one theory can explain why someone becomes a terrorist, it
may be possible to provide a checklist of possibilities that when combined may serve to
promote radicalization.
Frustration Aggression Theory
In examining the frustration aggression paradigm, it is clear that there are
possibilities of this theory providing some insight into why and how someone could
become radicalized. Ted Gurr (1970) points out that when individuals become frustrated
due to conditions they perceive as being unjust or unfair, and they further perceive that all
legitimate avenues for redress have been expired or are closed, then the frustration that
has built up over time results in these individuals becoming radicalized and eventually, a
small portion of the population that is radicalized actually chooses to commit terrorist
acts. Gurr (1970) suggests that the concept of “relative deprivation” explains the
perception of the way things out to be as compared to the way they are (Gurr 1970, 23).
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This perception may not be a true representation of the actual conditions but as a
collective value it can drive individuals to commit violence. According to Gurr, “The
frustration aggression relationship provides the psychological dynamic for the proposed
relationship between intensity of deprivation and the potential for collective violence
(Gurr 1970, 23). In a later work he suggests that, “impatience and frustration provide an
expressive motivation and rationalistic grounds that make it likely that some activists will
decide to experiment with terror tactics “ (Gurr 1990, 87).
While the frustration aggression concept is central to explaining why people may
begin down the path to radicalization leading to terrorism it does not provide the
overarching answer to this question. Many Muslims are unhappy with the conditions of
their lives but few decide to become terrorists. It is important to determine if there are
any specific phenomena that may serve to frustrate the target population, and if so, what
the significance of this frustration is to the process of radicalization. Sources of
frustration, especially among the Muslim communities in Western Europe could include
perceived economic and political deprivation; lack of social identity; and perceived
oppression as a result of government policy.

Economic deprivation/Poverty Theory
While many have, in the past, considered poverty and poor education to be the
driving force behind radicalization and recruitment into terrorist organizations, this model
has been found to be less representative than first thought and in some cases
unrepresentative. Alan Krueger (2007) points out that “a wealth of evidence now shows
that any effect of education and poverty on terrorism is indirect, complicated, and
probably quite weak” (Krueger 2007, 13). Further he suggests civil liberties are a more
8

important determinant of terrorism, and there may be some indirect link between
economic conditions and civil liberties. In an earlier work, he suggested radicalization
and terrorism should be viewed as a “response to political conditions and long-standing
feelings of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics” (Krueger &
Maleckova 2003, 119). This notion is supported by Mark Thomson and Maurice Crul
(2007) and by Robbert Woltering (2002) in their finding that children of immigrants are
better educated and are able to find more skilled employment than their parents. Further,
Erich Weede (1987) suggests that even in developing countries, inequality and economic
development do not lead to violence; with regime repression having only a weak
relationship. While it is accepted second and third generation Muslim immigrants are
better educated and have better economic opportunities than their parents and/or
grandparents, it seems there still exists a perception of inequity and discrimination
fueling discontent. This condition, coupled with the demonization of immigrants
following 9/11, makes this population susceptible to radicalization.
Efforts to integrate these immigrants have been both late and inadequate.
According to Hansen, “Migrants and their descendants are poorly represented in national
parliaments; they suffer disproportionately high levels of unemployment; and they thus
draw disproportionately on welfare services” (Hansen 2003, 33). In 1998 employment
figures for the United Kingdom showed 75.1% of whites were employed and 57% of the
black and Asian populations were employed. This contrasts sharply with employment
rates of 35% for Pakistanis and 41% for Bangladeshi immigrants. In Germany, the
employment figures are equally appalling. Unemployment rates among immigrants were
nearly twice the national average of 8.8% with fully 16.4% unemployment.
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Aside from employment inequities, income disparities also plague the Muslim immigrant
community.
Income inequality can be considered another source of frustration among the
immigrant Muslim population. While educational opportunities are equal for nearly all
British citizens, employment practices and the opportunity to make equal wages
continues to be a problem. Unemployment and underemployment can be seen as further
contributing factors to explain immigrant radicalization.
Table 1 illustrates clearly the income inequalities that exist between Muslim and
non-Muslims. As we can see, while few Muslims exist at the higher income brackets,
Muslims are represented significantly and disproportionately in the income level that is
seen as below the poverty line for each country.

Table 1: Income

Country
Muslims
General Public Difference
France: Euros
29,500 or more
20%
32%
-12%
7,500-29,499
35%
41%
-6%
Less than 17,500
45%
27%
+18%
Spain: Euros
21,500 or more
7%
26%
-19%
14,500-21,499
20%
24%
-4%
Less than 14,500
73%
50%
+23%
Germany: Euros
30,000 or more
12%
26%
-14%
18,000-29,999
35%
39%
-4%
Less than 18,000
53%
35%
+18%
Great Britain: B.P.
40,000 or more
13%
23%
-10%
20,000-39,999
26%
38%
-12%
Less than 20,000
61%
39%
+22%
Pew Research Center May 2007

While it can be argued that poverty is not the cause of terrorism, it must be
considered that income inequality, or at least the strong perception of inequality, could
serve as a catalyst to radicalization.
10

Terrorism as political violence
Ehud Sprizak (1998) considers terrorism to be a political phenomenon resulting
from “a prolonged process of delegitimization of the established society or regime…a
process whose beginning is, almost always nonviolent and non-terroristic” (Sprizak 1998,
78). Ted Gurr (1998) sees radicalization as the road to terrorism and explains it as “a
process in which the group has been mobilized in pursuit of a social or political objective
but has failed to make enough progress toward the objective to satisfy all activists” (Gurr
1998, 87). Participants at an Oslo conference June 2003 listed several ‘root causes’
routinely associated with terrorism. Among them are a lack of democracy, eroded civil
liberties, and a breakdown in the rule of law, extreme ideologies, the experience of
discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origins, and the experience of social
injustice, to name but a few (Horgan 2005).

The Process Model
John Horgan (2005) suggests that becoming a terrorist is a process that starts with
becoming radicalized, moves to actively engaging in terrorist activities, and in the final
stage of disengagement moving away from the terrorist group or activities. He feels that
the discussion of terrorism as a process is essential to moving the discussion away from
attempts to define terrorism or analyze the phenomenon through a series of events. What
is important to the process model is explaining, “behaviours and their antecedents,
expected consequences, and outcomes that are associated with terrorism” (Horgan 2005,
80). While focusing on the questions of ‘how’ people move through the process, Horgan
does not ignore the burning question of ‘why’ individuals decide to engage in terrorist
activities. Offering examples of the IRA ‘terrorist’ who began by marching in
11

Republican marches, became an activist, and was eventually charged with. “several
attempted murders, attempted kidnapping, arms possession, as well as membership in an
illegal organization,” this individual did not consider himself a terrorist but rather a
participant in the ongoing process of politicization in Northern Ireland (Horgan 2005,
85). Interestingly, this individual was raised in a non-political home. His exposure and
witness to police brutality of the nationalist was central to his development of sentiments
toward the nationalist cause and his joining of the Republican movement.
Horgan discusses catalysts as primary factors in the individual’s decision to become
involved in terrorism. These catalysts can include the witnessing of racially, ethnically,
or religiously based abuses by majority groups, police, military, or government: the
murder, torture, or victimization of a friend or family member; the persecution of a group
or community the individual identifies with, particularly when there are fundamentalist
groups involved; or the individuals response to government policies that are perceived as
threatening the individual or the groups they associate themselves with. It is important to
note that this association can extend to populations in other counties. It is well known
that new recruits into al-Qaeda cells and other groups associated with the global Salafi
movement in Europe were developed by creating a psychological link between them and
Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. They were compelled to join their
‘Muslim brothers’ in combat and travelled to fight alongside them, thus receiving vital
terrorist training.
Another attractant to terrorism can be the individual’s desire to be part of a group
as a result of his/her identification with the group’s leader, the stated religious or political
ideology of the group, or the desire to gain social status within the community by joining
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the group. Lastly, Horgan suggests that timing is critical to the process of joining a
terrorist group. It is well known that individuals who are recruited into terrorist
organizations are typically vetted in order to ensure internal security. New members are
given low level tasks to perform while their trustworthiness is evaluated by the leaders of
the cell or group. It is interesting to note that there are cases where European Muslims
who went to train with al-Qaeda returned prior to completing their training finding the
conditions and the ideology too extreme for their liking. In these cases, the cold reality of
terrorist training did not match with the ‘romantic’ idea of being a terrorist. Consider the
harm such individuals could do to a terrorist cell or larger organization if they had been
handed the entire ‘playbook’ upon initial interest or after first arriving at the training
camp.
Using Horgan’s concept of the process model it is interesting when one considers
the possibility of identifying individuals who might be vulnerable to terrorist
radicalization based upon their individual experiences and sentiments as a result of those
experiences. Other factors include perceptions of political efficacy, social status, cultural
security, and perceptions of equality, opportunity, coupled with sentiments of cultural or
religious persecution. This begs the question, can the radicalization of some Muslim
immigrants in Great Britain be considered a result of the ‘root causes’ of terrorism or are
these radicalizing factors more individualistic in nature and rooted in the individual’s
perceptions that then serve as catalysts to radicalization?

13

Government policy as a catalyst
Policy can serve as a potential catalyst to radicalization. Terrorist writings from
the nineteenth-century confirm provocation of the government was seen as strategic in
order to provoke repressive actions that could be used to rally support for the terrorist
cause (Crenshaw 1998). Gregory Miller (2007) agrees that harsh government policies
can result in ‘cycles of violence.’ Further, he suggests inaction can be just as detrimental,
allowing violent factions to take hold within a country, much as we have seen in the
United Kingdom. With radicalism on the rise, and terror attacks on the home front, such
permissiveness is viewed as excessive and dangerous (Leiken 2005). New policies
regarding immigration and security are being implemented to address these concerns.
However, Paul Wilkinson (2007) warns such measures must be rooted in the rule of law
and seek to uphold human rights to, “insure these values and the institutional safeguards
that ensure their continued observance are not sacrificed on the grounds of ‘protecting
national security’” (Wilkinson 2007, 9).

Immigration policy
Immigration policy within the United Kingdom has changed significantly as a
result of terrorist concerns. Post World War II immigration policy was primarily
concerned with the rebuilding and economic expansion of the United Kingdom. Such a
policy, designed to meet short-term economic interests, did little to ensure the long-term
economic viability of the immigrant population or the upward mobilization of second and
third generation immigrants (Hansen 2003). The result of this policy has been the
alienation of the children and grandchildren of Muslim immigrants, “born and bred under
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European liberalism,” now underemployed and made to feel unwelcome (Leiken 2005,
4).
Even before 9/11, economic downturns in the U.K. created an anti-immigrant
sentiment among non-immigrants. Opposition to immigration and new support for antiimmigration parties and policies increased as levels of unemployment rose (Sides and
Citrin 2007). Applications for those seeking asylum saw a decrease in acceptance from
85.9% in 1990 to 23.8% in 1997 (Rudolph 2003). New policies regarding immigration
have become very restrictive, especially for Muslims. Since September 11, 2001, the
migrant-as-a-threat paradigm has shaped new immigration policy (Ibrahim 2005). The
prominent philosophy is the enemy outside will be kept out through strict immigration
control and the enemy within will be hunted down by security forces. By identifying the
foreigner as the threat, Elspeth Guild (2003) suggests such action can serve to justify the
expulsion of foreign nationals as well. Such a move is supportive of Christopher
Rudolph (2003) and his 9/11 hypothesis where he states, “newly established links
between migration and military threat will swing grand strategy sharply toward closure”
(Rudolph 2003, 606). As immigrants become viewed as a security threat as a result of
ongoing terrorist operations, it can be expected that future opportunities for immigration
will be closed and efforts will be undertaken to deport any current immigrants who are
suspected of terrorist involvement. One manifestation of past immigration policy is the
isolation of the Muslim immigrant community within the United Kingdom (Leiken
2005).
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Social Identity/Assimilation
Policies focused on multiculturalism are viewed as having created conditions
which separated the Muslim immigrant community, resulting in racism, discrimination,
and a general sense of being disadvantaged, generating feelings of hostility (Abbas 2005).
Tahir Abbas (2005) points out that a vast majority of Muslims, “are often trapped in low
income employment, suffer heavy ethnic penalties through underemployment, live in
some of the poorest housing with poor amenities, and tend to suffer high rates of illness.”
(Abbas 2005, 163). The model of assimilation in the United States following the
Japanese and Chinese immigration cycle in the 1920s-30s found immigrants developing
local economies, with second and third generation immigrants becoming fully assimilated
and functioning as a part of the larger population. Such assimilation served to diminish
cultural differences and facilitated the mobilization of the children and grandchildren of
these immigrants during the post war era (Alba&Nee 1997). This is not the picture found
within the Muslim immigrant community in the United Kingdom. A shared sense of lack
of belonging and exclusion from mainstream politics, creates a condition of “disaffection,
disenfranchisement and isolation” that function to lead both “poorer and richer Muslims”
to radicalization (Abbas 2007).
While the British government accepts the realities of immigration, there are now
calls to “reclaim British-ness” (Melotti 2006, 206). New laws on immigration, asylum
seekers, and citizenship have limited the flow of newcomers. Additionally, new laws
now require biometric identification of immigrants, with naturalization and long-term
stays more difficult, and a requirement that new foreigners settling in the United
Kingdom learn English, in addition to other measures targeted at facilitating integration
(Melotti 2006). The need to create this sense of British-ness is viewed as necessary given
16

the realization that fully 81% of the Muslim immigrant population views themselves as
Muslim first and British second.
This disconnection and ostracization from European society has produced some
strong sentiment among the immigrant population across a wide range of issues. The
Pew Research Group conducted a survey through the Pew Global Attitudes Project to
measure Muslim attitudes in Europe, and the findings are very enlightening and sobering.
As a measure of identification, when asked, “What do you consider yourself first?” 81%
of the Muslims in Great Britain answered that they considered themselves Muslim first
and British second. In Spain the number was 69% Muslim first, Germany was 66% and
France followed at 46%. 2
Given the history regarding the treatment of and policies toward the Muslim
immigrant population in Europe, and terrorist attacks that have taken place in the last few
years, it comes as no surprise that Europeans are concerned about Islamic extremism.
When polled about how worried they actually were about Islamist extremism, 78% of
Germans responded that they were very/somewhat concerned, as did 77% of those from
Spain, 75% from the Netherlands, 73% from France, and 70% from the United
Kingdom. 3 Further immigration is also a concern shared by non-Muslims in Europe.
When asked about immigration concerns associated with opposition to Turkey’s
inclusion into the European Union 81% of the French saw it as a bad thing. Likewise

2

Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity, The Pew
Global Attitudes Project. July, 2006. P.3.
3
Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics, The Pew Global Attitudes
Project. July, 2005. P. 18.
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76% of the Germans, 67% of those from the Netherlands, and 44% of Great Britain’s
expressed concern regarding further immigration resulting from EU acceptance. 4

Marginalization
The marginalization of the Muslim immigrant community via multiculturalism is
seen in how the British government dealt with discrimination. By promoting
multiculturalism among the immigrant populations, the unintended effect was the
isolation of those populations, preventing them from fully assimilating into British
society. While discrimination was historically seen as a black-white issue, with most
Muslims considering themselves to be white, the laws did not address discrimination on
the basis of religion. Muslims were considered to be solely a religious group and direct
discrimination was lawful under the 1976 Race Relations Act; a condition that was not
changed until 2003 (Modood & Ahmad 2007). The issue of discrimination has been
highlighted recently by the controversy surrounding the niqab (veil) and the comments of
Member of Parliament (MP) Jack Straw regarding the cultural separation created when a
Muslim woman wears a veil. Isaac Kfir (2007) points out that the government response
to these and other issues fails to assuage the angst of the Muslim street because they do
not talk to the young people. As a result, “young British Muslims increasingly take the
position that civil protest is insufficient and that only through the use of violence would a
change be made” (Kfir 2007, 102). A prime example of this condition is the story of
Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikkh, a British born Muslim of Pakistani origin who, having
gone to the private Forest School and studied at the London School of Economics, chose
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to join the jihad and has now been sentenced to death for his involvement in the kidnap
and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl (Kfir 2007).
Security policy
While studies showing links between immigration and criminal activity are
greatly exaggerated, Margaret Thatcher’s statement that “we joined Europe to have free
movement of goods, not to have free movement of terrorists, criminals, drugs, and illegal
immigrants” only serves to perpetuate the “criminological axis” as it relates to Muslim
immigrants (Karyotis 2007, 9). Internal security has become a key issue in the United
Kingdom. Since September 11, 2001, British Muslims report being disproportionately
targeted for “stop and searches.” From 2002-2003, these stop and searches rose among
the Asian community by 285%, and 2003-2004 increases were another 40% raising the
number of stop and searches to almost 30,000 (Poynting & Mason 2006).
Anti-Terrorism legislation, rushed through in the wake of 9/11, resulted in the banning of
sixteen Islamic organizations and the arrest of over 1000 Muslims with only twenty
convictions by 2006 (Poynting & Mason 2006; Abbas 2007). This situation is
exacerbated by comments like those of MP Hazel Blears, the minister responsible for
counter terrorism, who said in 2005, “Muslims will have to accept the reality that they
will be stopped and searched more often than the rest of the public” (Abbas 2007, 294).
Therefore, British Muslims argue much of the responsibility for the rise in radicalization
“lies squarely with the host society” (Szrbis, Baldassar, & Poynting 2007, 266).
Isolation, disenfranchisement, and the restriction of civil liberties seem to make
quite a case for radicalization and violent action. In his analysis of the social dynamics of
terrorism, Austin Turk (1982) suggests political violence, “may be the product of a
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scarcely articulated resentment of felt obstructions and sensed antagonists, or of a highly
developed consciousness and analysis of political relationships” (Turk 1982, 121).
Another victim in the wake of Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe will most likely be the
multiculturalism that has existed in the United Kingdom. With the Muslim birth rate in
Europe being triple that of non-Muslims, it is expected the Muslim population will
double by 2015 (Taspinar 2003). This realization, coupled with the reality that the
Muslim street in Europe is “on its way to having more political weight than the Arab
street of Egypt or Saudi Arabia,” has brought further calls for assimilation and an end to
multiculturalism (Taspinar 2003, 77). Calls for assimilation are more easily understood
when one considers it is difficult to differentiate between Muslims who harbor antiwestern views but are non-violent, and those who are willing and ready to resort to
violence. “This distinction can be frustrating for the political establishment, as evidenced
by the Muslim community’s reaction to the 7 July bombings in the United Kingdom,
where the leaders of the Muslim community condemned the atrocity but seemed to
insinuate that they understood the anger of the terrorists” (Azzam 2007, 123).
Maha Azzam (2007) points out that “radicalization does not emerge in a vacuum”
(Azzam 2007, 124). With this understanding, and the understanding of the literature
relating to policies past and present that affect Muslims, it is possible to see how some
within the Muslim community can become radicalized and seek to participate in violent
terrorist activity. However, while it is easy to blame the policies of the host government,
it must be stated that without the rhetoric of the Islamist Imams, and foreign recruiters
sent by the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda, seeking to recruit these disaffected youth
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into their jihad, this radicalization might follow a more conventional path of political
protest and street violence rather than terrorism.

Demographics
In order to fully examine the roots of radicalization, we must also consider what
the demographic of the ‘typical’ Islamist terrorist is in the United Kingdom. Age is one
variable that must be considered when seeking to find a target population for study.
Sageman’s sample of 172 terrorists found the average age for joining the jihad was 25.69
years of age (Sageman 2004). However, in his more recent work, examining the
‘homegrown’ phenomenon, Sageman (2008) finds that younger individuals, many in their
early teens, are seeking to join the terrorist movement. However, no work has been done
to establish an updated estimate regarding age beyond the 25 average. One reason for the
high percentage of young terrorists is the practice of engaging university students in
Islamist discussion groups which are seeking to locate viable targets for recruitment.
This same process can be seen in the Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorist group in West
Germany. In his examination of the RAF, Klaus Wasmund (1986) found the terrorist
group rose out of the organized student movements of the 1960s and 70s. His view was
terrorists were “victims of group thinking,” and his focus on group dynamics serves as a
point of enlightenment when considering the radicalization process (Wasmund 1986,
194).
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Group Dynamics
Many scholars agree that the radicalization within the Muslim community is
strongly influenced by group dynamics and their interaction in Islamic study groups and
other prayer groups (Smelser2007; Sageman 2004; Krueger 2007; Kfir 2007; Crenshaw
1989). Many of these group meetings are not only held on University campuses, but are
often funded by the University in response to demands from the student movement
leaders (Islamist recruiters) and threats of discrimination. The dispossessed/radicalized
college student is one representative group targeted for recruitment. The other target
group is made up of troubled youths who are estranged from their families and searching
for a sense of belonging (Roy 2005). These youths, also in small groups, find themselves
easy targets for radicalization and recruitment into terrorist activity much the same way
youths are recruited into street gangs in the United States. The individuals are brought
into the mosque and form Islamist study groups which become their surrogate families.
From here it is a simple process of radicalization via Islamist ideology and recruitment
into the jihad (Smelser 2007). There is, however, a common theme between both groups;
dispossession. Dispossession, according to Neil Smelser (2007), “is the perception on the
part of the group that it is systematically excluded, discriminated against, or
disadvantaged with respect to some meaningful aspect of social, economic, and political
life to which it feels entitled” (Smelser 2007, 16).
The evolution of the group can be considered central to the radicalization process,
particularly among the immigrant Muslim population. Terrorism scholars point to the
importance of the group or the “bunch of guys” to the growth of, or recruitment into
terrorist cells (Crenshaw 1981; Sageman 2008; Vidino 2006). The evolution along the
path to radicalization that leads to the formation of the small group may be considered the
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turning point of the radicalization continuum. Once within the group, the radicalization
process seems to speed up as the members of the group begin to isolate themselves from
the general population, and serve as the self-motivating force behind the group’s
collective identity and radicalization efforts.
Considerable work within social science has been done to examine how “closed”
groups can gain a sense of identity that leads to an us-vs-them mentality. The 1954
Robbers Cave Experiment, conducted by Muzafer Sherif proved an excellent example of
how quickly small groups can form identities and become adversarial to those that exist
outside the group. Twenty boys were chosen and split into two groups (the Eagles and
the Rattlers) and placing them in an isolated location for three weeks. By the end of the
experiment the Eagles and the Rattlers had, “entered into conflict” (Fine, 2004). Most
interesting are the conclusions Sherif (1954) and his group make regarding the reaction to
shared frustrations. In the conclusion he considerers the approaches used to explain intergroup behavior and states:
One of these approaches advances frustration suffered in the life history of the
individual as the main causal factor and constructs a whole explanatory edifice
for inter-group aggression on this basis. Certainly aggression is one of the
possible consequences of frustration experienced by the individual. But, in order
that individual frustration may appreciably affect the course of inter-group trends
and be conducive to standardization of negative attitudes toward an out-group,
the frustration has to be shared by other group members and perceived as an
issue in-group interaction (Sharif 1961, 202).
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This same phenomenon can be seen as immigrant Muslim men, brought together
by shared frustrations and a growing interest in radical ideology form study or prayer
groups, developing into a cohesive unit that begins to meet daily isolating themselves
from family and friends by moving into an apartment or home, quitting school or jobs,
and spending all their time reading jihadist literature and watching jihadist video’s.
Crenshaw (1998) suggests that the group members begin to engage in ‘one-upmanship’ to
see who can be the most devout or the better jihadist leading potentially to involvement
in terrorist activities.
Recruitment of Muslim youths
There are three primary groups from which the Islamists seek to recruit troubled
youths who are estranged from their families, disaffected college students and young
professionals, and inmates within the prison system. Troubled youths are the most
vulnerable to radicalization, much like young delinquents recruited into street gangs; they
are usually relegated to performing support functions for the group (stealing materials,
money, and so on.) These young Muslims have usually been in legal trouble, are often
users of alcohol or drugs, have had significant difficulties with their parents, and may be
estranged from their homes. In cases where these individuals become radicalized, it
usually occurs when a small group of friends brings them to a mosque for shelter. Once
inside the mosque, he becomes a part of a prayer group of other disaffected youths, who
then become his surrogate family. In this environment, the young Muslim is then ripe for
recruitment by a radical Mosque member who might lead a prayer group, or an Islamist
imam whose message is anti-western and promotes the Islamist agenda (Smelser 2007,
98). Smelser admits that this relationship is complicated, but states that the mosque and
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its leaders, “helped provide the religiously based ideological frame for the groups, thus
assuming a supplementary rather than a simply indoctrinating role. By virtue of this
pattern, religious ideology and group affiliation serve to supplement and reinforce one
another and work toward the kind of commitment that would propel young men into lives
of righteous battle, exposure to danger, and sometimes suicide” (Smelser 2007, 98).
One example of this dynamic is Salman Abdulla, a seventeen-year-old high
school drop out, who had been involved in street violence:
“Two older boys from the gym he used in Bradford told Abdullah about a
preacher from Finsbury Park, and took him along when they went to hear Abu
Hamza, who was appearing at a community hall near their home. The cleric
spoke about the frustration of Abdullah’s generation, who felt no genuine
affiliation to Britain, the country of their birth, nor to their ancestral land,
Pakistan, which they had never visited. He spoke quickly, his voice rising as he
offered his audience an alternative allegiance-Islam” (O’Neil & McGrory 2006,
77).
Abdullah was recruited to fight in the jihad, send to Kashmir for training and combat, and
returned to Finsbury Park ‘a hero’ in the eyes of his fellow Islamists in London.
College recruitment
Recruitment of middle and upper class second and third generation immigrant
Muslims is done in a very different way. Student groups on University campuses funded
by Islamist organizations like al-Muhajiroun (Kfir 2007, 105), Hizb ut-Tahrir (Baran
2005, 7), Jamat-e-Islami (Husain 2007, 72), and the Muslim Brotherhood reach out to
young Muslim students just as many student groups seek membership on many American
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college campuses (Taarnby 2005, 43) and these student groups that go by names like the
Muslim Unity Organization and the Young Muslim Organization. Radical student group
leaders begin by seeking privileges, from the university, on behalf of their Muslim
members. These usually begin with requests for a designated hall for daily prayers and
escalate to concessions regarding Muslim dress, customs, and even demands for a hallal
menu for food that meets Islamic standards.
Meetings can include fiery Islamist rhetoric and the showing of films from
conflict areas like Bosnia and Afghanistan, depicting ‘atrocities against their Muslim
brothers’. The most radical groups will conclude these types of meetings with calls for
volunteers to go and fight in the jihad. Students answering this call are sent to training
camps where their indoctrination and terrorist training begins in earnest. While some of
these new recruits leave these training camps early, and do not participate in any fighting
or future terrorist attacks, the ones that stay are fully fledged jihadists, and represent a
significant danger upon return to their home country.
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METHODOLOGY
The Purpose of this Analysis
The purpose of this analysis is multifaceted. First, it was important to determine whether
it was possible to develop an indicator or measure of the individual’s potential for
radicalization. Then, using this measure, we asked whether other variables could be used
to ‘explain’ the vulnerability to radicalization among the Muslim population that was
surveyed. While this is in no way an attempt to develop a ‘terrorist profile’ it does offer
the unique opportunity to gain insight into the individual experiences and perceptions that
may lead one to become vulnerable to terrorist radicalization and recruitment. It is
important to note that while an individual may be highly vulnerable to radicalization, this
does not in any way guarantee that he or she will join a terrorist group or commit
terrorist acts. They may never engage in these activities, may find legal ways to seek
redress, or may offer financial support to causes or groups they are sympathetic to
without being directly involved in any terrorist acts (although financial and logistical
assistance is now, in many cases, considered a terrorist act).

Data Source
As previously stated, the group to be studied is Muslims within Great Britain. The Pew
Research Center’s Spring 2006 Global Attitudes Survey of 15 Nations, provides a Great
Britain sample size of N=902 with a substantial over-sample of Muslims with N=412.
Answers to questions from this survey provide the necessary data to measure the
individual’s vulnerability to radicalization as the dependent variable, and provide
substantive responses to questions that allow for the measurement of individual data and
attitudes regarding public policies and personal experiences/perceptions of concern.
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Prior to analysis, the subset of British Muslims was isolated from the entire 15 nation
dataset as were the questions that received responses from the subject group.

Radicalization as the Dependent Variable
To measure the dependent variable it was necessary to develop a ‘radicalization’
scale. Such scaling was needed in order to measure the independent variables against a
range of dependent variables without complex multivariate analysis. Louis Guttman
(1944) suggests it is possible to create a scale from a universe of qualitative data. By
choosing a group of variables that would represent conditions of the phenomenon to be
measured and applying a quantitative measure to the qualitative answers, a scale can be
obtained. Such a measure has two advantages. “First, a mnemonic advantage, for a
compact representation would be easier to remember than a large table; and second, if it
were desired to relate the universe to other variables it would be easier to do so by means
of a compact representation than by using the large multivariate distribution of the
attributes in the universe (Guttman 1944, 142). The theory is that as an individual ranks
higher on the scale, they would also rank higher in the universe of independent variables
(Guttman 1944).
However, Guttman (1944) warns that while a group of variables may be scalable
for one population, they may not for another population. For this reason, certain
variables will be excluded from the scale. For instance, citizenship, which could be seen
as a very important issue in the United Kingdom among second and third generation
immigrants, would be irrelevant in France where children of immigrants are
automatically considered citizens. While this scale was being created to measure the
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vulnerability to radicalization in the United Kingdom, care was taken when choosing
scalable variables so that future studies in the region may utilize the same process.
Therefore, citizenship will be among the universe of independent variables.
It is necessary to clarify that this scale or score is not an indicator of the individual’s
involvement in terrorist activity. It is a representation, based on the analysis provided
herein, of what can be considered the individuals susceptibility to radicalization as it
relates to the cumulative scoring of the responses to ten questions that make up the
‘radicalization set’ and the segregation of these scored into high, moderate, and low
vulnerability to radicalization. These ten variables were chosen because they allow for
the measurement of certain ‘known’ conditions that exist within the terrorist/radicalized
community as described in the terrorist literature.
Variables used to develop this scale reflect the individual’s national identity,
degree of social satisfaction, identification with terrorist ideology or actions, the
measurement of alienation or disenfranchisement felt by the respondent, the willingness
to develop alternate realities, the displacement of blame for hardships/conditions on
external entities, perceptions that the individuals way of life/cultural identity is at risk,
views regarding violence as a means of political protest, and views regarding the
acceptability of suicide bombing.
Self identification
How an individual perceived his/her identity as it relates to the nation is
important. The question from the survey establishing the individual’s self-identification
as British or Muslim first provides for an understanding of this perception. The
importance of this measure is seen in Melotti’s (2006) discussion of the need for creating
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a sense of “British-ness” given the knowledge that 81% of the Muslims in the U.K. see
themselves as Muslims first and British second. It is important to understand if this same
attitude pervades the Muslim sample in the Pew survey. While the survey indicates that
there is a self identification of Muslim first in 81% of the Muslim respondents, it is
crucial to determine whether this identification is of a moderate or of a more
fundamentalist nature.
The individual’s identification with terrorist groups, agendas, or actions may
provide a valuable indication of their openness to radical ideologies. These sentiments
may also reflect the person’s agreement or disagreement with their own country’s foreign
policy decisions regarding groups like Hamas or al-Qaeda. The individual’s
identification with these groups is viewed by Crenshaw (2000) as being an essential part
of the process of becoming a terrorist. This is seen as the beginning of the us-vs-them
paradigm of radicalization. Within the survey, when questioned whether there was a
struggle between moderate Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists 58.7% or 242
individuals felt there was indeed a struggle, and 15.8% (65 people) indentified with the
Islamic fundamentalists in this struggle. Additionally, when asked if the individual felt
there was a conflict between Islam and modernity 48.3% felt there was a conflict.
Following the same identification line, 71.8% of the respondents felt there was a strong
sense of Muslim identity in Great Britain with 28.2% raking it very strong, and 86.3% of
these respondents identifying this as a good thing.
Identification of external protagonist
Within the list of potential radicalizing elements is the sense that others are to
blame for the struggles of the individual or the group they are associated with. The
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perception of social, financial, or political persecution are strong catalysts toward
radicalization. Respondents were asked if they felt Muslim nations should be more
prosperous than they are today. The response was an overwhelming 83.7% (345) of
those surveyed felt that Muslim nations should be more prosperous. These respondents
were then asked who they felt was to blame for the lack of Muslim prosperity and while
27.0% felt it was due to the lack of education in the Muslim world and 35.9% felt it was a
result of corruption in the government of Muslim countries, still 17.4% felt that the
policies of the United States and other Western nations were to blame for the economic
problems in the Muslim nations.
The identification of an external protagonist can be the foundations of frustration
that can potentially serve to drive an individual toward radicalization. Additionally, it is
central to the development of the us-vs-them paradigm that develops in the latter stages
of the radicalization process.
Conflict
With Western countries seen as the protagonist in the struggle for Islamic success,
it should be considered how the British Muslims view the compatibility of Western
Democracy within Muslim countries. The survey offers the statement that Democracy is
a western way that won’t work in most Muslim counties. When given this statement 59%
felt that Democracy would work well, but 29.9% answered that Democracy would not
work well in Muslim countries.
Additionally when asked whether they considered relations between Muslims
around the world and people in western countries to be generally good or bad, only
23.3% indicated they felt relations were generally good while 62.1% responded that they
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considered these relations to be generally bad. Further, when asked who they thought
was to blame for these bad relations, of those who responded in this manner only 10.5%
indicated they Muslims were to blame, while 47.7% blamed people in Western countries
and Christians, 0.8% blamed Jews and 29.3% felt both Muslims and Westerners were to
blame.
Concern for the future of Muslims
Another potential source of frustration leading to radicalization is a sense of
disenfranchisement that would lead one to question the future viability of the individual
or the group to exist in the current environment. When questioned regarding the
individuals concern for the future of Muslims in the country, fully 80.3 % were either
very concerned or somewhat concerned with over 50% being very concerned. While
there are several independent variables that allow for the identification of the source of
this concern, the importance of this measurement lies in the combined effect with the
perception that there are external threats to the future of the Muslim population in Britain.
Perceived connection with terrorist figure
One of the indicators along the path to radicalization is the beginning of a
perceived connection to a terrorist group or figure. As discussed previously, John
Horgan lists this association with the group or leader as central to the individual’s process
of becoming a terrorist. Within the survey the respondents were asked how much
confidence they had in Osama bin Laden. There were a significant number who had little
or no confidence in Bin Laden; 11.2% not too much confidence and 57.3% had no
confidence at all. However, 10.4% had some confidence and 4.6% had a lot of
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confidence, totaling 15.0% who has at least some degree of confidence in Osama bin
Laden.

Refusing to accept reality
Crenshaw suggests that when an individual is on the path to radicalization, they
begin a pattern of refusing to accept realities that are not in keeping with their newly
found radical ideology. While many of the previous questions are subjective in nature,
asking who the individual felt was responsible for certain conditions, there is one
question on the survey that allows us to consider the individuals willingness to accept
what is known to be true and would certainly be at odds with a radical Islamist ideology.
When asked, Do you believe that groups of Arabs carried out the attacks against the
United States (the World Trade Center and the Pentagon) on September 11, 2001, only
18.2% of the respondents indicated that they believe Arabs were responsible. Fully
53.6% did not believe that Arabs were involved and 27.9% indicated they did not know.
Given that it is well documented who was involved in the hijacking of the airplanes and
the use of those planes as guided missiles into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
added to the fact that Osama bin Laden himself has praised those who were involved, it is
of great interest that so many respondents choose not to accept what is known by most to
be the truth.
Acceptance of violence as a tactic
How an individual feels about the use of violence as an acceptable means of
political protest will carry considerable weight on the radicalization scale. It should be
considered that as a respondent becomes more radicalized they would be more willing to
consider violence as an acceptable method of expressing political discontent. This
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variable can potentially be considered the tipping point for radicalization. It represents
the willingness or unwillingness of the subject to potentially move beyond legal means of
political expression to illegal violent action. Living “outside normal standards” is a
shared experience for radicalized people participating in violent political action (Porta,
1995).
Thus, moving further along the radicalization continuum, gaining insight into the views
of the respondent as they relate to suicide bombing will serve as a capstone to the
measurement of the individual’s potentiality for radicalization. Being willing to sacrifice
one’s own life, or at least agreeing with the concept can be seen as the pinnacle of
radicalization that would make one susceptible to terrorist ideology and recruitment into a
terrorist organization or cell. An individual who finds suicide bombing to be acceptable
will most likely have responses supporting a high degree of radicalization from bottom to
top. Hoffman (2006) points out that the suicide bomber is one who is revered in terrorist
groups. Special privileges are given to those who are to become martyrs, and martyrdom
“has become an ambition for Palestinian children” (Hoffman 2006, 158).
When asked how the respondent felt about suicide bombing 3.2% felt it was often
justified, 13.1% felt it was sometimes justified, and 9.7% suicide bombing as rarely
justified, for a total of 26.0% who felt that suicide bombing was in some way justified.
The remaining 74% were divided among those who felt it was never justified (68%) or
either didn’t know or refused (6%).
Using these variables to create a vulnerability to radicalization score for each
respondent, it was then possible to perform analysis to determine the relationship
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between the independent variables and radicalization vulnerability, and the strength of
that relationship.
Independent Variables
Independent variables for this study include age, education, employment,
income, overall level of satisfaction, immigration status (citizenship), heritage, having a
bad experience due to race, ethnicity, or religion, and religiosity.
Age
Knowing the age of respondents is important to understanding whether there is
indeed any particular demographic that could be considered more susceptible to
radicalization. It is generally considered that Muslims between the ages of 17 and 29
make up the majority of this radicalized group (Crenshaw 2000; Sageman 2004). If it can
be found that radicalization occurs more often within a certain age group, this will allow
for the targeting of potential sources of radicalizing phenomenon. For example, if it is
determined that radicalization occurs more often among individuals over the age of
twenty five, then consideration would be given to the potential radicalizing variables
associated with college and the post college experience. In order to facilitate analysis the
respondents were grouped and represented as follows: 18-29 years of age (42%), ages 3039 (33.5%), ages 40-49 (12.4%), and over 50 years of age (10%).

Gender
While it is generally considered that most terrorists are male, this is a
misconception. Females have been used effectively in terrorist campaigns ranging from
the Red Brigade in Germany, the anti-colonial terrorist campaign in Algeria, to the
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modern insurgency in Iraq and the use of female suicide bombers. Even within the
Muslim population it would be a mistake to think that only men are susceptible to
radicalization and recruitment into a terrorist cell or group, or even committing terrorist
acts as a ‘lone wolf’. The Muslim respondents of this survey were divided proportionally
with 52.4% being male and 47.6% being female. This method of identification is used to
determine if there is a large percentage of female respondents who are at risk of terrorist
radicalization.
Social satisfaction
Social satisfaction is an essential consideration. Understanding the social
satisfaction measure provides insight into the degree of marginalization that is felt by the
Muslim sample. Issues of discrimination, lack of political efficacy, and persecution can
potentially create strong feelings of dissatisfaction that can motivate the individual to
participate in civil protest. This measure can be seen as a reflection of the
frustration/aggression hypothesis put forth by Post (1998), where dissatisfaction is seen
as a catalyst to aggressive action.
Feelings of alienation or disenfranchisement can be a result of many factors.
Immigration, social, and security policies may create these conditions. Additionally,
failure of the immigrant population to assimilate within their new host country can also
add to these feelings. A perception of non-inclusion can also be seen as a compelling
reason to participate in civil protest. With no outlet for civil discourse, the concern is that
young Muslims will choose to engage in violence to institute change (Kfir 2007).
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The survey of British Muslims found that while 50.5% of the respondents were
satisfied, fully 37.9% or 156 individuals were dissatisfied with the way things were going
in their country, 11.4% didn’t know and one individual refused to answer.

Education level
Education is seen as key for several reasons. The limiting effects of lacking a
high school education can potentially serve as an avenue for frustration leading to
criminality and radicalization. With the radicalizing influences on college campus,
understanding how many college students might exhibit signs of radicalization can be
very informative. Lastly, in light of recent terrorist attempts by college-educated
individuals, it must be considered whether radicalization might occur after the education
process is completed and the individual is exposed to other influences like limited
employment opportunities or wage discrimination that could contribute strongly to the
radicalization.
Within this survey, the education levels were divided and represented as follows:
Table 2 Education levels in Great Britain

Level of Education
No qualifications
GCSE grades D or below
GCSE grades A-C
A Level exam
College degree, teaching, or nursing
cert.
Upper level degree
Other qualifications
Don’t know
Refused

Percentage
9.0%
5.1%
18.2%
24.8%
20.9%
12.6%
7.0%
1.5%
1.0%

It is necessary to understand that there are examinations administered at different
times during the individual’s education and the education variable for this analysis is a
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combination of test scores at these levels and higher education levels that would correlate
more closely to the American model of higher education. GCSE exams are administered
when British students are 15-16 years of age. These exams are subject exams and are
graded on a A-G scale with A being the highest. Therefore, according to figure 2, 5.1%
of the Muslim population that took this exam scored at the D or below level and this was
their highest level experience with the educational system. Similarly 18.2% scored C or
better but chose not to advance to the A level exams that are considered the equivilant to
a college entrance exam of which 24.8% took this exam but did not complete a college
degree. From this point the British system is easily understood as compared to the
American educational system.
It should be considered that with nearly 14.1% of the Muslim population lacking
what can be considered a completed high school education; there is the potential for
poverty within the Muslim community that is disproportionate to the population as a
whole. This break down provides the opportunity to examine the relationship between
education and the risk of radicalization.
Income levels
Income will be measured to determine if there is any validity to the concept of
economic limitations and frustration. The Pew Research Center’s 2007 report indicates
there is a significant income gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in Great Britain at
every level of income. This report shows that while the 23% of the general population
exceeded 40,000 pounds per year of income only 13% of Muslims achieved this income
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level. More concerning is the knowledge that 61% of Muslims make under 20,000
pounds per year compared to 39% of the overall population. 5
Exposure to racial or religious discrimination
Understanding the level to which a Muslim individual has been exposed to
domestic security measures/violence allows for an analysis of whether the perception of
Muslims being targeted for such action can be considered valid. While it is known that
“stop and searches” have steadily risen in Great Britain, it is essential to gain an
understanding regarding the influence this and other policies has had on the Muslim
population and how such an action is viewed by that group (Poynting & Mason 2006).
Exposure to racial or religious discrimination and violence is the variable to be
considered. Respondents indicated whether they have had a bad experience due to race,
ethnicity, or religion. While 70.1 percent report no bad experiences, 29.6% or 122 out of
412 reported having a bad experience due to race, ethnicity, or religion. These bad
experiences can be considered one of the catalysts that could potential ‘drive’ someone
toward radicalization.
Immigration status and citizenship
Immigration, citizenship, and heritage will be obtained in order to categorize the
respondents to determine if there is any pattern of radicalization among a particular group
(South Asians, Middle Eastern immigrants, or North African Muslims). Further,
citizenship will be broken down to determine if the respondents are first generation
immigrants or the children/grandchildren of Muslim immigrants. Citizenship is used to
establish if the individual is a non-citizen immigrant, an immigrated British citizen, or a
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naturally born British Muslim. The findings are that 46.1% (190) report being born in
Great Britain’s with 53.6% (221) having been born in another country. Of the 221 not
born in GB, 58.4% report having immigrated over 15 years ago; 12.7% arrived between
6-10 years ago; 8.1% within the last 3-5 years; and 6.8% within the last two years. This
data is critical and is used to analyze the relationship to the susceptibility to radicalization
among immigrants as well as among those born in Great Britain. Of the 412 respondents
fully 90.3% are British citizens. Counties of origin range from all over the Middle East,
Asia and North Africa. The largest ancestral or ethnic groups are as follows: Pakistan
55.3%; India 12.9%; Bangladesh 10.7%; and other at 12.9% (with no further specificity).
Reaction to the War on Terror
Many have speculated that the ‘War on Terror’ that is led by the United States
with the assistance of its allies, Great Britain being our principle ally, has been the main
catalyst to radicalization among the Muslim Diaspora. Respondents were asked if they
favored or opposed the U.S. led effort to fight terrorism. While forty individuals (9.7%)
either didn’t know or refused, 12.9% were in favor of the U.S led effort to fight terrorism
while 77.4% (319) were opposed to this effort.
Religiosity
Religiosity is measured to determine if a respondent is simply Muslim by heritage
or if they are a practicing Muslim who may potentially be subjected to radical Islamist
ideology while attending services in the Mosque. It is well known that certain Imams
preach a radicalized form of Islam and call on their members to join the jihad.
Several questions address Mosque attendance and reliance on religious leaders for
guidance. When questioned regarding the importance of religion, 87.4% of the
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respondents indicated that it was very important; 10.9% felt it was somewhat important;
with the remaining 1.7% ranging from not too important to not at all with three people
who either didn’t know or refused to answer. It has already been discussed that when
asked how they identify themselves, fully 81.8% considered themselves Muslim first and
British second; 7.5% felt they were both equally; and 7% responded British first. Within
this category of religiosity, when respondents were asked how often they attended the
mosque for salah and Jum’ah prayer 30.6% indicated more than once per week; 23.3%
attended once per week; 4.6% once per month and 10.9% only a few times per year.
Interestingly 30% of the respondents either seldom or never attended mosque for prayers.
This is an interesting statistic when juxtaposed with the responses to who the respondents
looked to for guidance on Islam. In response to this question 43.7% looked to their local
Imam or sheik; 26.9% to Imams and institutions outside their country like al-Azhar or the
Saudi Imams of Mecca and Medina; 15.8% indicated that they did not seek guidance
from any of the sources listed in the survey but offered no alternate answers.
Geographic location
When one considers the radicalizing effect of some Muslim religious leaders who
are markedly anti-Western, and who call for individuals to join the jihad, it should be
considered that geographic location will be important to know. Within the survey group
72.3% of the respondents were located in the Yorkshire region of Great Britain, 20.9% in
Granada, 4.1% in Tyne Teen, and the remainder were scattered among five other regions.
With this data it may be possible to consider if there is a geographical concentration of
individuals who are vulnerable to radicalization.
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Hypotheses
Hypothesis #1: Vulnerability to radicalization is a result of age, education level, and/or
income.
Important to understanding the vulnerability to radicalization is an examination of the
demographics of the population and how these factors relate to the levels of vulnerability
within the group. In order to understand these relations the age, sex, education level, and
income of the respondents was tested to determine if there was any relationship between
these variables and the respondent’s vulnerability to radicalization. Literature in the field
would indicate that individuals who are the most vulnerable to radicalization would be
younger males, less educated, and existing at the lower end of the income scale.
Therefore, there will be a negative relationship between age, education level, and income
and increasing levels of vulnerability to radicalization. Further, as the vulnerability to
radicalization rises there will be a rise in the percentage of males.

Hypothesis #2: Frustration among the members of the Muslim community in Great
Britain is responsible for their vulnerability to radicalization
There are variables that allow for an investigation into impact of social and
political frustration on the individuals vulnerability to radicalization. The premise of the
frustration aggression theory is that as levels of frustration increase there will be an
increase in the individual’s willingness to engage in terrorist activity. This being the
case, as the percentage of responses indicating a justification for frustration increases, we
will find an increased level of vulnerability to radicalization.
As the percentage of respondents who had a bad experience due to race, ethnicity,
or religion increases there will be a correlated increase in the vulnerability score. It is
well established that individuals who became radicalized and joined the IRA were often
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motivated by the mistreatment of themselves or those they knew at the hands of the
British Authority.
As the vulnerability score increases there will be an increase in the percentage of
respondents who express dissatisfaction with the current conditions within Great Britain
and express concern regarding the future of Muslims in the country. Dissatisfaction or
perceived injustices are central to the frustration aggression theory previously discussed.
It is reasonable to consider that individuals, who are dissatisfied, in keeping with this
theory, would be vulnerable to radicalization.
It is well known that the 9-11 hijackers were recent immigrants to Germany who
became radicalized shortly upon their arrival from their home countries. It is thought that
when immigrants first arrive to their new host country they become isolated and
disaffected as their opportunities do not meet with their expectations. This perception of
discrimination or injustice, in keeping with the frustration aggression theory, makes the
individual susceptible to terrorist radicalization. If this phenomenon is to hold true, those
respondents who have immigrated to Great Britain and remain in country longer will be
less vulnerable to radicalization and therefore the length of stay will have a negative
relationship with vulnerability. Along these same lines, those who are naturally born
British citizens should be less prone to radicalization and have lower vulnerability to
radicalization scores than those who have recently immigrated.
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Hypothesis #3: Dissatisfaction with the policies of the United States is the source of the
vulnerability to radicalization within the Muslim community in Great Britain.
As the ‘war on terror’ is seen by many Muslims as a ‘war on Islam’, it is
important to understand how the respondents view the U.S. led war on terror as it related
to their individual vulnerability score, particularly since Great Britain is an important ally
to the United States in this effort. Given the sentiment of the Muslim community to this
action, an increase in the percentage of individuals who oppose the U.S. led efforts to
combat terrorism should correlate to an increase in the individual scores relating to the
vulnerability of radicalization.

Hypothesis #4: Individuals who are more religious within the Muslim community are
more vulnerable to radicalization.
The power of the radical Islamist message is seen as a serious threat in combating
terrorism. It is well known and established in the previously presented literature that this
message often promulgates from within the established religious institutions, the
mosques. The individual who is exposed to radical ideology within the mosque is at risk
of becoming radicalized as they view the leaders as individuals of authority. As the
individual becomes radicalized, their attendance at the mosque becomes more frequent.
Therefore, with a higher frequency in mosque attendance there will be an increase in the
vulnerability score. Additionally, there will be a strong correlation regarding who the
individual looks to for guidance (their local imam or other religious leaders).
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Hypothesis #1:
As a result of the analysis that was performed using cross tabulation it is possible
to determine the viability of the hypothesis that higher levels of vulnerability to
radicalization are a result of youth, sex, education and income level. Within the survey
set of Muslims in Great Britain thirty one individuals or 7.5% were found to be highly
vulnerable to radicalization, 218 of those surveyed (52.9%) were moderately vulnerable,
and the remaining 163 respondents (39.6%) had a low degree of vulnerability to
radicalization. Interestingly when each level is examined in detail, patterns do in fact
begin to develop.
Of the thirty one highly vulnerable respondents, twenty were between 18 and 28
years of age, eight were 30-39 years of age, one was in the 40-49 age grouping and two
of the respondents who were highly vulnerable to terrorist radicalization were over 50
years old. Of the two hundred eighteen who were moderately vulnerable, 47.2% or one
hundred three respondents were 18-29 years old, seventy-three or 33.5% were 30-39
years old, twenty-three were 40-49 and nineteen were over 50 years old. Of those who
were the least vulnerable to radicalization fifty-nine (36.2%) were 18-29, fifty-seven
(35.0%) were 30-39, twenty-seven (16.6%) were 40-49, and twenty (12.3%) were over
50 years old.
While it is commonly held that males are more vulnerable to radicalization, the
findings of this analysis would suggest otherwise. It is important to state that the sample
of 412 respondents contained 216 males (52.4%) and 196 females (47.6%). Within the
sample group that was highly vulnerable to radicalization 51.6% or sixteen of the thirty
one were in fact female, with the remaining fifteen being male. Similar results were
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found within the group that is considered to be moderately vulnerable to radicalization
with 111 or 50.9% of the 218 respondents who are moderately vulnerable being female.
As can be seen in table 3 only the group that is considered to have the lowest
vulnerability to radicalization contains more male respondents (52.4%) than females
(42.3%).
Table 3 Male / Female

Sex
Radicalization
high vulnerability

Male
Count

16

31

48.4%

51.6%

100.0%

6.9%

8.2%

7.5%

107

111

218

% within vulnerability scores

49.1%

50.9%

100.0%

% within Sex

49.5%

56.6%

52.9%

94

69

163

% within vulnerability scores

57.7%

42.3%

100.0%

% within Sex

43.5%

35.2%

39.6%

216

196

412

52.4%

47.6%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

% within Sex

low vulnerability

Total

Total

15

% within vulnerability scores
moderate vulnerability

Female

Count

Count

Count
% within vulnerability scores
% within Sex

Another common assumption regarding ‘who becomes a terrorist’ is that they are
single. Within this study, of the thirty-one respondents who were highly vulnerable
thirteen had never been married, one was separated, one was divorced, and sixteen were
married. The numbers are even more surprising in the moderately vulnerable category
were seventy-two of the two hundred eighteen had never been married but one hundred
twenty-five respondents in this category were married when interviewed.
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Continuing to consider the male-female paradox, education was analyzed to
examine the relationship with the individual’s vulnerability to radicalization and their
level of completed education or performance on exam levels as can be seen in table 4 at
the end of this discussion. While it is considered that those with the least education
would be the most vulnerable to radicalization, only thirty-seven respondents were found
to had no qualifications. Of these only two (one male, one female) were considered
highly vulnerable to radicalization, while seventeen (eight male and nine female) were
moderately vulnerable, leaving thirteen males and five females to comprise the remaining
eighteen respondents in the low vulnerability group that had no educational qualification.
Of the respondents that stayed in school long enough to take the GCSE exams but
scored D or below, only one female was within the highly vulnerable group. The twelve
that were moderately vulnerable were evenly divided among male and female as were the
remaining eight that had a low vulnerability to radicalization. Respondents who scored C
or better on the GCSE exams were more numerous with 75 having achieved this level of
education. Of these, six were highly vulnerable to radicalization (three males, three
females), forty-four were moderately vulnerable with twenty-four females and twenty
males, and twenty-five (12 males, 13 females) had a low vulnerability to radicalization.
The largest group within the education variable was those who had risen to take
the A-Level exams for college entrance. While there is no discussion regarding if or how
much the respondent attended college, it is clear, however, that they sat for these exams
but did not complete college to the level of achieving a degree. Of the one hundred two
individuals who took the A level exam, seven women and five men comprise the twelve
who ranked as being highly vulnerable to radicalization, fifty-six (thirty four women and
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twenty-two men) were moderately vulnerable, while the remaining thirty-four
respondents, twenty-two women and twelve men, had a low vulnerability score.
Higher education is thought to minimize the individual’s vulnerability to
radicalization. Of the eighty-six respondents that, at minimum, had completed a college
degree, five were highly vulnerable to radicalization, forty-two were moderately
vulnerable and thirty-nine had low vulnerability. This is the first level where the number
of men exceeded the number of women in every level of vulnerability. Higher level
degrees (Masters level or PhD) was the second highest group with eighty-seven
respondents, with only one male who scored as being highly vulnerable to radicalization.
Sixteen men and eleven women, for a total of twenty-seven, were moderately vulnerable,
with the remaining twenty-four respondents (18 men, 6 women) having a low
vulnerability to radicalization. The twenty-nine who indicated they had other levels of
qualification were made up of two men and two women who were highly vulnerable,
fourteen (8 men, 6 women) who were moderately vulnerable and seven men and four
women for a total of eleven who had a low vulnerability score. The remaining ten
respondents indicated that they either didn’t know their level of education or refused to
respond.
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Table 4 Vulnerability / Education

vulnerability to radicalization (VR) scores (DV)
Education
No qualifications obtained

high
Count

moderate

low

Total

2

17

18

37

% within VR scores

6.5%

7.8%

11.0%

9.0%

GCSE or O level grades D or Count
below / CSE grades 2 or
% within VR scores
below

1

12

8

21

3.2%

5.5%

4.9%

5.1%

6

44

25

75

19.4%

20.2%

15.3%

18.2%

12

56

34

102

38.7%

25.7%

20.9%

24.8%

5

42

39

86

% within VR scores

16.1%

19.3%

23.9%

20.9%

Higher degree (masters, PHD, Count
NVQ 5)
% within VR scores

1

27

24

52

3.2%

12.4%

14.7%

12.6%

4

14

11

29

12.9%

6.4%

6.7%

7.0%

0

2

4

6

.0%

.9%

2.5%

1.5%

0

4

0

4

.0%

1.8%

.0%

1.0%

31

218

163

412

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

GCSE or O level grades A-C / Count
CSE grade 1/ NVQ 2
% within VR scores
A level / NVQ 3

Count
% within VR scores

Degree / HND / teaching or
nursing certificates / NVQ 4

Other qualification

Count

Count
% within VR scores

Don't know

Count
% within VR scores

Refused

Count
% within VR scores

Total

Count
% within VR scores
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Lastly, within this hypothesis, it is generally considered that poverty is a source or root
cause of radicalization. With the poverty line in Great Britain for a couple with no
children at 183 pounds per week, this places the annual poverty figure at just under
10,000 pounds per year for a family of two, less for single individuals and more for those
with children. Table 5 allows for the examination of the relationship between income
and levels of vulnerability to radicalization. With ninety-one respondents (22.1%)
making less that 10,000 pounds per year it is interesting for find only seven with a high
vulnerability score. As can be seen in the chart below, high vulnerability to radicalization
can be found at all income levels with four making between 10,000-19,000 pounds, seven
between 20,000-29,000 pounds, three at the 30,000-39,000 pounds income level, two
making 40-49,000 pounds and three making over 50,000 pounds (BP) per year. While
we see 46.2% within the moderately vulnerable category making less than 10,000
pounds, it is clear that existing at or below the poverty line does not have a significant
impact on the vulnerability of the individual to become radicalized toward terrorism.
Interestingly, as income goes up, the percentage of the respondents within each income
level that are ranked in the highly vulnerable category goes up. When income is less than
10,000BP only 7.7% within this income group are highly vulnerable, but as income rises
to 30-39,000BP the percentage goes up to 10.7% and reaches a high of 12.0% in the
50,000BP and over income level. What is evident however is there are many more
individuals who indicate a moderate vulnerability to radicalization existing at or below
20,000 pounds per year. With 50% of this income level being moderately vulnerable it is
possible to consider the validity of the argument that relies on the individual’s perception
of poverty as a factor in the radicalization equation. The preponderance of moderately
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vulnerable respondents in each income level below 30,000 pounds would further support
this argument.
Table 5 Vulnerability / Income

Vulnerability to radicalization (VR)
scores
Income

high

Less than 10,000 pounds
per year

Count

10,000-19,999 pounds

Count

42

91

7.7%

46.2%

46.2%

100%

4

68

47

119

3.4%

57.1%

39.5%

100%

7

39

29

75

9.3%

52.0%

38.7%

100%

3

17

8

28

10.7%

60.7%

28.6%

100%

2

11

5

18

11.1%

62.1%

27.8%

100%

3

10

12

25

12.0%

40.0%

48.0%

100%

4

20

12

36

11.1%

55.5%

33.4%

100%

1

11

8

20

5.0%

55.0%

40.0

100%

31

218

163

412

7.5%

52.9%

%

Count
Count
%

40,000-49,999 pounds

Count
%

50,000 pounds and over

Count
%

Don’t know

Count
%

Refused

Count
%

Total

Total

42

%
30,000-39,999 pounds

low

7

%
20,000-29,999 pounds

moderate

Count
%

51

39.6% 100.0%

Hypothesis #2:
When one considers the potential impact of security policy and racial intolerance
in Great Britain, it would be easy to consider these abuses as having a strong influence on
the radicalization of the Muslim population. However, the analysis shows (Table 6) that
of the one hundred and twenty two respondents who indicated they had a bad experience
due to race, ethnicity, or religion; only ten, which comprise only 8.2% of those who
report having a bad experience, were ranked as being highly vulnerable to radicalization.
Interestingly, the remainder of the highly vulnerable group indicated no bad experience.
The largest group that did report a bad experience was those who were moderately
vulnerable, with eighty-one respondents (66.4%). It is clear from table 6 that once again
we see a large number of respondents within the moderately vulnerable category having
had a bad experience. The data would indicate that this event has little significance on its
own as the majority report no bad exoperience.
Table 6 Vulnerability / Bad experience

Bad experience due to race, ethnicity,
religion

Vulnerability to
Radicalization
high vulnerability

Yes
Count
% within Bad
experience due to
race, ethnicity, religion

moderate
vulnerability

low vulnerability

Count
% within Bad
experience due to
race, ethnicity, religion
Count
% within Bad
experience due to
race, ethnicity, religion

Total

Count
% within Bad
experience due to
race, ethnicity, religion

No

Don’t know

Total

10

21

0

31

8.2%

7.3%

.0%

7.5%

81

136

1

218

66.4%

47.1%

100.0%

52.9%

31

132

0

163

25.4%

45.7%

.0%

39.6%

122

289

1

412

100.0% 100.0%
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100.0% 100.0%

When indications of dissatisfaction with the way things are going in Great Britain
are analyzed with the vulnerability scores, once again it is difficult to make a connection.
It is evident in table 7 that the individual’s level of dissatisfaction with the conditions in
Great Britain does not provide significant indications of being a source for radicalization.
This is clear when fifteen of the thirty-one highly vulnerable respondents indicate they
are satisfied with the way things are going. One could hypothesize that this satisfaction is
based upon the tumultuous conditions in Great Britain and the growing influence of the
radical Muslim community but this would be speculative at best. The questions asked
and the associated data provide no way to make such estimation. It is interesting
however to consider that those who were moderately vulnerable, again show a level of
dissatisfaction higher that those who were satisfied making up 66% of the entire group
that was dissatisfied.
Table 7 Vulnerability / Satisfaction

Now thinking about Great Britain, overall, are you
satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going
in our country today?
Vulnerability
scores
high
moderate
low
Total

Satisfied
Count
Count
Count
Count

Dissatis
fied

Don’t
know

Refused

Total

15

10

6

0

31

7.2%

6.4%

12.8%

.0%

7.5%

95

103

19

1

218

45.7%

66.0%

40.4% 100.0%

52.9%

98

43

22

0

163

47.1%

27.6%

46.8%

.0%

39.6%

208

156

47

1

412

100.0% 100.0%

100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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Given the recent attack in Western Europe, including Great Britain, by Muslim
immigrants, there is considerable desire to understand the impact of the immigrant
population as it pertains to terrorist radicalization. By doing a cross tabular analysis of
the vulnerability scores with the measure of the individuals having been naturally born in
Great Britain or having immigrated, it is possible to make such a determination. As can
be seen in table 8, there does not seem to be a clear indication that being an immigrant
make one any more likely to be vulnerable to radicalization that does being a naturally
born citizen. Of the thirty-one highly radicalized respondents the majority (19) were born
in Great Britain, with the remaining twelve having been born outside the country.
Among the 218 individuals who were moderately vulnerable, 110 were born in country
and 107 outside Great Britain.
Table 8 Vulnerability / Born in Great Britain

Were you born in (country) or in another country?
Vulnerability to
radicalization
high
moderate
low
Total

Born in
(Country)
Count
Count
Count
Count

Another
country

Refused

Total

19

12

0

31

10.0%

5.4%

.0%

7.5%

110

107

1

218

57.9%

48.4%

100.0%

52.9%

61

102

0

163

32.1%

46.2%

.0%

39.6%

190

221

1

412

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

What is most interesting regarding the question of radicalization among the immigrant
population is that of the twelve highly vulnerable immigrants only two arrived within two
years of being interviewed. There was one respondent each in the 3-5 years, 6-10 years,
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and 11-15 years, but there were seven individuals who had been in the country for over
15 years who ranked highly vulnerable to radicalization. While those who were
moderately vulnerable were more evenly distributed there were only eight who had been
in the country less than two years and seven between 3 and 5 years. Fifteen of the
moderately vulnerable group had been in Great Britain between 6 and 10 years and
seventeen had arrived between 11 and 15 years ago. Most interesting is that of those
immigrants who were moderately vulnerable to terrorist radicalization, a total of fiftynine respondents had come to Great Britain over 15 years previous to being a part of the
survey. Conventional wisdom and the literature would indicate that new arrivals would
be the most vulnerable to radicalization as a result of their lack of assimilation, limited
opportunities, and isolation from their culture; but the data would seem to indicate that
exactly the opposite could be the case.
An examination of the ancestry of the respondents who immigrated over 15 years
prior to the survey shows that of those highly vulnerable to radicalization two were from
Bangladesh, one from India, three from Pakistan, and one other (not specified). Of those
who were moderately vulnerable and had been in Great Britain over 15 years, one was
from Algeria, five from India, one from Iran, one from Morocco, thirty-eight were from
Pakistan, one from Somalia, and there were five others (not specified). In both groups
the immigrants from Pakistan make up the majority but this is not unexpected given that
seventy-six of the one hundred twenty nine respondents who immigrated over 15 years
prior to the survey are from Pakistan and those of Pakistani ancestry represent 55.3% of
the 412 individuals that were surveyed. Therefore, it is consistent that nineteen of the
thirty-one respondents who were ranked as highly vulnerable to terrorist radicalization
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are of Pakistani ancestry. Of the remaining twelve, four were from Bangladesh, four
from India, and four either scored other (not specified) or didn’t know.
Further analysis of immigrant status and vulnerability become particularly
interesting when examined within the age groupings previously discussed. Of the
nineteen respondents who were born in Great Britain with high vulnerability scores,
fourteen are between 18 and 29 years of age, with only six immigrants within this age
group being highly vulnerable, accounting for twenty of the thirty-one respondents that
had a high vulnerability score. Table 9 provides a breakdown according to having been
born in Great Britain or in another country as compared to age groupings within the
vulnerability paradigm.
Table 9 Vulerability / Age

age groupings
Were you born in (country) or in another country?
Born in
(Country)

18-29

high VR score
% within age groupings
Moderate VR score
% within age groupings
low VR score
% within age groupings
Total

30-39

0

19

11.8%

6.8%

14.3%

.0%

10.0%

68

35

3

4

110

57.1%

59.3%

42.9%

80.0%

57.9%

37

20

3

1

61

31.1%

33.9%

42.9%

20.0%

32.1%

59

7

5

190

100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

100.0%

high VR score
% within age groupings

6

4

0

2

12

9.7%

5.1%

.0%

5.6%

5.4%

moderate VR score
% within age groupings

34

38

20

15

107

54.8%

48.1%

45.5%

41.7%

48.4%

low VR score
% within age groupings

22

37

24

19

102

35.5%

46.8%

54.5%

52.8%

46.2%

62

79

44

36

221

100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0%
radicalization
scores

Total

1

119

Total
Refused

over 50

4

100.0%
Another
country

40-49

14

moderate VR score
% within age groupings
Total

56

1

1

100.0%

100.0%

1

1

100.0%

100.0%

Hypothesis #3:
In order to test the impact of United States policy and actions on the vulnerability
to radicalization, three questions were examined to determine whether there was any
consistency in response to U.S. policy in the War on Terror among the varied
vulnerability groups. First, was the response to the question regarding the United States
war on terror and whether the individual was in favor or not in favor of this action. Of
the thirty-one who were highly vulnerable to radicalization, twenty-nine were not in favor
of the U.S. led war on terror and two were in favor. The moderately vulnerable group of
two hundred eighteen respondents also showed an overwhelming disfavor with the U.S.
action with one hundred sixty-seven who were not in favor and only thirty-two who were
in favor of the U.S. led war on terror, with the remaining nineteen either not knowing or
refusing. Surprisingly, even the low vulnerability group expressed similar sentiments
with one hundred twenty-three of the one hundred sixty-three within this group not in
favor of the U.S. effort. All totaled, of the four hundred twelve respondents, three
hundred nineteen were not in favor of the U.S. led war on terror.
Another area where insight can be provided is in responses to how much of a
threat the U.S. presence in Iraq poses to Middle East stability. Within the entire sample,
two hundred seventy one respondents felt it posed a great danger and eighty six saw it as
a moderate danger. Among the vulnerability groups the one with the highest
vulnerability was divided among the twenty-five who saw the U.S. presence as a great
danger and the remaining six who felt it was a moderate danger. The moderately
vulnerable group contained one hundred fifty-six respondents who felt it was a great
danger to stability and thirty-six who saw this action as having a moderately dangerous
effect. There were, however, nine within this group that felt the U.S. presence in Iraq
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posed only a small danger to stability and five felt it was no danger at all. The low
vulnerability group contained ninety who saw this as a great danger, forty-four
considered in a moderate danger, four felt it posed no danger, and twenty-five indicated
they did not know.
Another area where U.S. policy or action has had an impact on Muslims is the
media’s reporting of incidents in U.S. prisons at Abu Graib in Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay
Cuba. Exposure to these media reports is considered to be another factor that could
possibly promote radicalization among the Muslim community. When questioned if they
had heard the reports of abuses at these prisons, three hundred seventy-seven of the group
had heard them, while seventy-four had not and one did not know. Table 10 provides a
breakdown that shows twenty-six of the thirty-one highly vulnerable respondents had
heard of the abuses. The moderately vulnerable group also had a high number of
individuals (177) who had heard of the U.S. abuses in these prisons, as had one hundred
thirty-four in the low vulnerability group. While it is clear the majority of the
respondents are aware of the reports of abuses, these events do not seem to indicate a
strong influence on the vulnerability to radicalization as knowledge is spread throughout
all the vulnerability groups.
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Table 10 Vulnerability / Reporting of abuses

Heard about reports about abuses in American
run prisons at Abu Graib, Guantanamo
and elsewhere
Yes – have No – have not
heard of it
heard of it

VR Scores
high

Count

5

0

31

7.7%

6.8%

.0%

7.5%

177

41

0

218

52.5%

55.4%

.0%

52.9%

134

28

1

163

39.8%

37.8%

100.0%

39.6%

337

74

1

412

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Count
% within Heard
about reports

low

Count
% within Heard
about reports

Total

Count
% within Heard
about reports

Total

26

% within Heard
about reports
moderate

Don't
know

Hypothesis #4:
While the terrorist literature suggests that Islamist terrorists are more politically
than religiously motivated, vulnerability as a result of religious involvement within the
Muslim community has become a major concern given the revelations of local imams
like Abu Hamza preaching anti-western sermons calling for jihad against the United
States and the West. Within Great Britain there is considerable concern regarding the
effect of these radical imams and how much they are influencing the religious community
toward terrorist radicalization. There are three variables that allow for some measure of
the relationship between religious involvement and identity and the vulnerability to
radicalization. First among these is the measure of the importance of religion to the
respondents. Within the highly vulnerable group, thirty of the thirty-one respondents
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indicated that religion was very important and the remaining one individual felt it was
somewhat important. This pattern holds true throughout the vulnerability groups with
three hundred and sixty of the four hundred twelve respondents indicating religion was
very important and forty-five responding that it was somewhat important. Only seven
respondents offered any other answer indicating not too importance, no importance, or
didn’t know or refused.
When respondents were asked how strong they felt the Muslim identity was
within Great Britain. Within the study group, two hundred ninety-six respondents
indicated they felt that the Muslim identity is either very or fairy strong, with only eightyone indicating not too strong and twenty four felt it was not strong at all. When these
responses are analyzed with regard to the vulnerability scores, sixteen of the highly
vulnerable respondents felt the Muslim identity was very strong and nine considered it to
be fairly strong. Only five felt it was not too strong and one saw it as not strong at all.
This was the only vulnerability group where the very strong’s outnumbered the fairly
strong respondents. Within the moderately vulnerable group, seventy-seven felt it was
very strong, ninety-nine responded it was fairly strong, twenty-eight not too strong, and
eleven felt it was not strong at all. The low vulnerability group comprised twenty-three
that the Muslim identity was very strong, seventy-two saw it as fairly strong, forty-eight
indicated it was not too strong, and twelve responded that the Muslim identity in Great
Britain was not strong at all. Clearly the majority of the highly vulnerable group was
consistent in their opinion that the Muslim identity in Great Britain was either very or
fairly strong, however six of the thirty-one respondents did not share this sentiment and
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shows that the identification questions does not explain vulnerability across the entire
group.
Respondents were asked who they went to for guidance on Islam. This question
offered several options ranging from their local Imam or Imam’s and institutions outside
Great Britain, to national religious leaders, religious leaders on television, none of these
or didn’t know. Within the group that is considered highly vulnerable to radicalization
twenty-eight sought guidance from either their local Imam (17 respondents) or Imams
and institutions such as al-Azhar or the Saudi Imams of Mecca and Medina (11
respondents). The remaining three individuals within this category sought guidance from
national religious leaders, leaders on television or answered none (one each). Within the
other two vulnerability groups there was a similar reliance on the local and foreign
Imams but these groups contained larger numbers of respondents answering that none of
the answers were applicable or they didn’t know. With no alternatives offered by the
respondent when answering no, it is not possible to determine if these individuals seek
guidance outside the formally recognized institutions such as leaders of radical prayer
groups or on-line religious web sites. It would be imprudent to suggest this is the case,
but would be an issue to be addressed in a future study.
An initial examination of mosque attendance as seen in table 11 would seem to
indicate there is no relationship between mosque attendance and the individual’s
vulnerability to radicalization. While it is clear that across all three levels of vulnerability
those who attend more than once per week outnumber those who attend only once a week
and the numbers continue to decline as attendance becomes more seldom. However such
an assumption may be hasty. In order to understand the impact of mosque attendance on
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the vulnerability to terrorist radicalization it was necessary to view these findings through
the filter of the male/female relationship.
When mosque attendance is viewed with the added consideration of the
male/female paradigm, the importance regarding the frequency of mosque attendance
changes significantly. As we can see in table 12, when males who were highly
vulnerable to radicalization are examined it is found that all fifteen respondents within
this group attended mosque at least once per week with nine reporting they attended more
than once per week. Interesting, the females within the highly vulnerable group were
found to either attend seldom or not at all (7 respondents), only a few times per year
(three respondents), but the remaining five highly vulnerable females indicated that they
attended mosque more than once per week. Given the limitations of the role of females
within the mosque it could be considered that those who attend infrequently or not at all
may receive their religious training outside the mosque but no questions provide this
insight. However, it is significant to understand that one hundred seventy of the two
hundred sixteen males and fifty-two of the one hundred ninety-six females addend
mosque at least once per week. Surprising is the difference in the number of males,
twelve, who never attend as compared to the eighty three female who indicated they
never attend.
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Table 11 Vulnerability / Mosque Attendance

On average, how often do you
attend the mosque for salah
and Jum’ah Prayer?

Vulnerability scores
high

More than once a week

Count
% within

Once a week for Jum’ah

A few times a year especially
for (example vary by country)

Count

Seldom

Count

% within
% within

Never
Total

43

126

11.1%

54.8%

34.1%

100.0%

6

50

40

96

6.2%

52.1%

41.7%

100.0%

0

14

5

19

.0%

73.7%

26.3%

100.0%

3

20

22

45

6.7%

44.4%

48.9%

100.0%

1

13

11

25

4.0%

52.0%

44.0%

100.0%

6

50

39

95

6.3%

52.6%

41.1%

100.0%

30

216

160

406

7.4%

53.2%

39.4%

100.0%

Count
% within
Count
% within

Total

69

Count
% within

low

14

Count
% within

Once or twice a month

moderate
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Table 12 Vulnerability / Mosque attendance: male/female

vulnerability scores
On average, how often do you attend the mosque for
salah and Jum’ah Prayer?
Male

More than once a week

Count
%

Once a week for Jum’ah

Count
%

Once or twice a month

Count
%

A few times a year especially Count
for (example vary by country)
%
Seldom

Count
%

Never

Count
%

Total

Count
%

Female

More than once a week

Count
%

Once a week for Jum’ah

Count
%

Once or twice a month

Count
%

A few times a year especially Count
for (example vary by country) %
Seldom

Count
%

Never

Count
%

Total

Count
%

64

high

moderate

low

Total

9

52

35

96

9.4%

54.2%

36.5%

100.0%

6

36

32

74

8.1%

48.6%

43.2%

100.0%

0

7

4

11

.0%

63.6%

36.4%

100.0%

0

4

11

15

.0%

26.7%

73.3%

100.0%

0

1

3

4

.0%

25.0%

75.0%

100.0%

0

5

7

12

.0%

41.7%

58.3%

100.0%

15

105

92

212

7.1%

49.5%

43.4%

100.0%

5

17

8

30

16.7%

56.7%

26.7%

100.0%

0

14

8

22

.0%

63.6%

36.4%

100.0%

0

7

1

8

.0%

87.5%

12.5%

100.0%

3

16

11

30

10.0%

53.3%

36.7%

100.0%

1

12

8

21

4.8%

57.1%

38.1%

100.0%

6

45

32

83

7.2%

54.2%

38.6%

100.0%

15

111

68

194

7.7%

57.2%

35.1%

100.0%

CONCLUSIONS
As scholars seek to identify a terrorist profile or gain understanding as to the root
causes of terrorism, it has become increasingly clear that there is no ‘silver bullet’ in this
endeavor. Dispositionist theories that include the existence of some sort of psychopathy
or a level of frustration that leads to aggression could not be confirmed within this study.
Similarly, situational arguments centered on negative conditions such as poverty, lack of
education, displeasure with current conditions, or bad experiences as a result of race,
religion or ethnicity cannot fully explain why people become radicalized toward
terrorism.

There are however certain variables that were examined as a part of this

study that provide some insight as to conditions that make individuals more vulnerable to
terrorist radicalization.
Within the analysis, a bivariate correlation was done between the vulnerability to
radicalization score (DV) and all the independent variables that were examined. Of
these, four were significant at the .05 level using the Kendalls Tau b measure. They were
the important of religion to the individual, sex, and being born in Great Britain. There
was a positive relationship with the importance of religion, indicating that individuals
who were more vulnerable to radicalization considered religion to be very important.
With regard to sex, there was a positive relationship between the level of vulnerability
and the probability of being female. This is of particular interest given that the ‘standard’
terrorist profile is being male. Another variable that measured significant at the .05 level
was being born in Great Britain. This is important given the commonly held assumption
that terrorists in western democracies are usually immigrants who are newly arrived and
bring their radical ideology with them to their new host country. As was seen in the
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analysis, those born in Great Britain were more vulnerable to radicalization followed
closely by immigrant who had come to the country over fifteen years previous to being
interviewed and had considerable time to assimilate and become encultured into British
society. Lastly, the profile of being single must be questioned as a result of the
significance of being married as it relates to being vulnerable to terrorist radicalization.
More interesting are those variables that were measured having significance at the
.01 level which would be considered very significant. One commonly held perception
was confirmed, that being the relationship between age and vulnerability. It was
determined that as the vulnerability scores rose, the age of the respondents went down.
Two policy issues, the U.S. presence in Iraq and opposition to the U.S. led effort in
combating terrorism, were both found to have positive relationships with the vulnerability
scores and were significant at the .01 level. Additionally, two variables within the
religiosity hypothesis, seeking guidance from local and foreign Imams and Mosque
attendance were also found to be positively related to increased levels of vulnerability to
terrorist radicalization and were significant at the .01 level.
What does this all mean to the study of terrorist radicalization? It should be
considered that the fundamental assumptions that have driven research in this field need
to be reexamined and a more multi-disciplinary approach should be considered in order
to obtain a more substantive understanding of this phenomenon. The dispositional and
situational arguments should be considered as integral to each other and future research
should be focused on identifying the combination of personalities, conditions,
perceptions, and experiences that will provide a more complete understanding of the
factors that influence radicalization. With this more complex understanding it may then
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be possible to address some of the issues that are central to creating vulnerability thereby
affecting the availability of recruits for terrorist radicalization.

Recommendations for future research
Building on this analysis of the vulnerability of Muslims in Great Britain to
terrorist radicalization, future research will be focused on performing a comparative
analysis of the remaining western democracies within the fifteen nation survey conducted
by the Pew Research Center to determine the consistency of these findings across the
broader European Muslim community. As such an analysis will vastly increase the
number of respondents (France-N=400 Muslims, Germany-N=413 Muslims, SpainN=402 Muslims); it should then be possible to engage in regression analysis that could
provide some predictive findings regarding the relationship of certain conditions and/or
situations and their influence on vulnerability to radicalization. Given the potential for
regression analysis it may then be possible to develop a panoramic picture of the
variables that could serve as catalysts making an individual more vulnerable to terrorist
radicalization. Finally, the analysis of Muslims within western European democracies
could then be compared to the findings of the analysis of Muslims within the United
States to gain insight into the similarities and differences of the populations and what
makes each more or less vulnerable to terrorist radicalization.
Attempts to engage in the identification of direct influences on radicalization will
require additional survey questions that may or may not be answered truthfully by the
respondents. The ongoing problem within the field of terrorism research of obtaining
reliable data will continue to be a valid concern given the criminal nature of the terrorist
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act and the transforming effect of radicalization on the individual’s perception. However,
the addition of a few more specific questions to the existing survey could provide
valuable data. For example, it would be beneficial to determine whether the respondent
attended college but did not complete a degree, and if they had participated in Muslim
student groups on campus. Measures of unemployment would also add significantly to
the demographic data including current employment status and past periods of
unemployment. Additionally, questions that identified if the respondent had traveled
abroad, where they traveled and how often, would allow for the examination of potential
foreign influence on Muslims who were born in Great Britain but seem to have a high
instance of being vulnerable to terrorist radicalization.
While it is recognized that only a very small percentage of Muslims within Great
Britain and other western European democracies will become radicalized toward
terrorism, it is important to understand that with nearly two million Muslims in Great
Britain, if one percent becomes radicalized toward terrorism there will be potentially
20,000 Islamist terrorists in Great Britain alone. The challenge is to provide substantive
analysis that will allow for the identification of factors that make individuals more
vulnerable to radicalization and implement actions and policies that, rather than serve to
further the level of frustration and conflict within the Muslim community, will seek to
ameliorate their impact and promote conditions that will not only limit future
radicalization but also serve to de-radicalize those who were most vulnerable to terrorist
radicalization.
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APPENDIX A
CREATION OF THE VULNERABILITY TO RADICALIZATION
SCORE
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Vulnerability to Radicalization Score
To develop the vulnerability to radicalization score it was necessary to attribute a score to
the responses of the ten variable questions. The following questions were used to
develop the additive vulnerability score and the scoring for the varied responses is
provided for each. The total possible additive score was 16.
Q.40. Now I’m going to read a list of political leaders. For each, tell me how much
confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs– a lot of
confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all. The
leader was Osama bin Laden.
Answer
A lot or some confidence
Other answers

Score
1
0

IF RELATION GENERALLY BAD (Q7=2) response to Q.7. Do you think that
relations these days between Muslims around the world and people in Western countries
such as the United States and Europe are generally good or generally bad? Those who
answered bad.
Q.8 Who do you think is mostly to blame for this, Muslims or people in Western
countries?
Answer
Score
People in Western Countries
1
Other answers
0
ASK IF THINKS MUSLIM NATIONS SHOULD BE MORE PROSPEROUS
(Q.10=1):
Q.11 What is most responsible for Muslim nations’ lack of prosperity? Is it the policies
of the U.S. and other western nations, the lack of democracy in the Muslim world, the
lack of education in the Muslim world, Islamic fundamentalism, or corruption in the
government of Muslim nations?
Answer
Policies of U.S. and other Western nations
Lack of Democracy in Muslim world
Other answers

Score
2
1
0
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Q.30 In your opinion, how many (Muslims/people) in our country support Islamic
extremists like al Qaeda –would you say most, many, just some or very few?
Answer
Most or many
Some
Other answers

Score
2
1
0

Q.16 In your opinion, how strong a sense of Islamic identity do Muslims in our country
have - very strong, fairly strong, not too strong, or not strong at all?
Answer
Very strong
Fairly strong
Other answers

Score
2
1
0

Q.5 Now on a different subject, some people feel that democracy is a Western way of
doing things that would not work in most Muslim countries – others think that democracy
is not just for the West and can work well in most Muslim countries. Which comes closer
to your opinion?
Answer
Democracy would not work
Other answers

Score
1
0

Q.27 Do you think there is a struggle in (survey country) between moderate Muslims and
Islamic
fundamentalists or don’t you think so? Q.28 Which side do you identify with more in
this struggle, moderate Muslims or Islamic
fundamentalists?
Answer
Fundamentalists
Other answers

Score
1
0

Q.24 How concerned, if at all, are you about the future of Muslims in this country – very
concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned, or not at all concerned?
Answer
Very concerned
Somewhat concerned
Other answers

Score
2
1
0
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Q.38 On a different subject, do you believe that groups of Arabs carried out the attacks
against the United States (the World Trade Center and the Pentagon) on September 11
(2001) or don’t you believe this?
Answer
Do not believe Arabs involved
Other answers

Score
1
0

Q.29 Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian
targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that,
no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel
that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely
justified, or never justified?
Answer
Often justified
Sometimes justified
Rarely but still justified
Never and others

Score
3
2
1
0
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APPENDIX B
USER AGREEMENT AND DISCLAIMER FOR THE
PEW RESEARCH CENTER
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This is a legal agreement between you, the end-user ("User") and Pew Research
Center (the "Center"). By downloading the survey data made available on this
web site ("Data") you are agreeing to be bound by the terms and conditions of
this agreement. If you do not agree to be bound by these terms, do not download
or use the Data.

The Center hereby grants to the User a non-exclusive, revocable, limited, nontransferable license to use the Data solely for (1) research, scholarly or academic
purposes, (2) the internal use of your business, or (3) your own personal noncommercial use. You may not reproduce, sell, rent, lease, loan, distribute or
sublicense or otherwise transfer any Data, in whole or in part, to any other party,
or use the Data to create any derived product for resale, lease or license.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, you may incorporate limited portions of the Data
in scholarly, research or academic publications or for the purposes of news
reporting, provided you acknowledge the source of the Data (with express
references to the Center, as well as the complete title of the report) and include
the following legend:

THE DATA IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARISING BY LAW OR OTHERWISE,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF COMPLETENESS,
NON-INFRINGEMENT, ACCURACY, MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE USER ASSUMES ALL RISK ASSOCIATED
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WITH USE OF THE DATA AND AGREES THAT IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
CENTER BE LIABLE TO YOU OR ANY THIRD PARTY FOR ANY INDIRECT,
SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DAMAGES FOR THE INABILITY TO
USE EQUIPMENT OR ACCESS DATA, LOSS OF BUSINESS, LOSS OF
REVENUE OR PROFITS, BUSINESS INTERRUPTIONS, LOSS OF
INFORMATION OR DATA, OR OTHER FINANCIAL LOSS, ARISING OUT OF
THE USE OF, OR INABILITY TO USE, THE DATA BASED ON ANY THEORY
OF LIABILITY INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, BREACH OF
CONTRACT, BREACH OF WARRANTY, TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE),
OR OTHERWISE, EVEN IF USER HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY
OF SUCH DAMAGES.

The Center has taken measures to ensure that the Data is devoid of information
that could be used to identify individuals (e.g., names, telephone numbers, email
addresses, social security numbers) who participated in or who were the subject
of any research surveys or studies used to collect the Data ("Personally
Identifying Information"). However, in the event that you discover any such
Personally Identifying Information in the Data, you shall immediately notify the
Center and refrain from using any such Personally Identifying Information.

This license will terminate (1) automatically without notice from the Center if you
fail to comply with the provisions of this agreement, or (2) upon written notice (by
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e-mail, U.S. or otherwise) from the Center. Upon termination of this agreement,
you agree to destroy all copies of any Data, in whole or in part and in any and all
media, in your custody and control.

This agreement shall be governed by, construed and interpreted in accordance
with the laws of the District of Columbia. You further agree to submit to the
jurisdiction and venue of the courts of the District of Columbia for any dispute
relating to this Agreement. The Pew Global Attitudes Project bears no
responsibility for the analyses or interpretations of the data presented here.
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